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Reprint of book originally published in 1926.
In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military
realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the
economic conditions for security success? This problem was
certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such
diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale
and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything
military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially
the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production
to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's
infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation
prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing:
Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy?
How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.
The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in
2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many
reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government
failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified
manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key
indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the
United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book
reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both
historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles
to implement grand strategies.
From the foreword: "During the 1980s a fable circulated within the
US Army concerning Soviet planning for a potential war with the
United States. In the most common version, a Soviet general is
alleged to have declared in frustration, "It is impossible to plan
against the Americans because they don't follow their own
doctrine." Many readers of this book will have heard (or said) that
"doctrine is only a guide." Indeed, the tactical agility
demonstrated by the US Army on the battle elds of Iraq and
Afghanistan is due in no small part to a cultural imperative that
prizes solutions above all else.While not disputing the value of
unorthodox solutions to dif cult challenges, the organizational
culture that underpins this perspective has resulted in a
widespread lack of knowledge of Army doctrine by com-pany and eld
grade of cers and mid-level and senior noncommissioned of cers.
Recognizing this, the Army has dramatically reengineered its
doctrine to distill the timeless principles into a series of
accessible, easily read documents. This process has led to a larger
discussion of what should and should not be called "doctrine," and
has also included discussion of how we as members of the profession
of arms conceptualize warfare. Unfortunately, this conversation has
not yet included the bulk of the Army's mid-level leaders. Dr.
Jackson's monograph is an excellent contribution to remedy that
shortfall. Its greatest value lies in the fact that it forces the
reader to reconsider basic assumptions about the purpose and
utility of doctrine, and what a nation's military doctrine says
about its military institution. Jackson's arguments are well
reasoned, his assertions are provocative, and his conclusions are
profound. After reading this work, your view and understanding of
doctrine will be powerfully enhanced, and will lead to lively
discussions at every level."
This work is a collection of observations, insights, and advice
from over 50 serving and retired Senior Non-Commissioned Officers.
These experienced Army leaders have provided for the reader,
outstanding mentorship on leadership skills, tasks, and
responsibilities relevant to our Army today. There is much wisdom
and advice "from one leader to another" in the following pages.
In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic
history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we
initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they
prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces
us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an
American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found
lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us
how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists
considerable debate ) to contribute to what we do-and how we do
it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the
analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to
understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the
physical demands of combat.
Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay's leadership and his
relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important
features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks
from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of
their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks
to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale's relationship by
focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in
defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government's
legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered
regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing
poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy.
This energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of
toppling the government. A change in US policy coincided with the
emergence of Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum,
rejuvenated the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and
restored the Philippine government's legitimacy, all in less than
four years. Their shared, genuine empathy for the Filipino people
fostered deep sociocultural understanding. Their combined
capabilities and resources then translated empathy and
sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the
Huks and rebuild popular support for the government.
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular
security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host
nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful
establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance
of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory
force, consent of the host nation's government to exist, and that
the security force is accountable to the local civil authority.
Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force
could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host
nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership
does not guarantee a local irregular force's success. The host
nation's involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is
important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the
examination of archival research and primary source interviews
associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and
the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the
prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The
paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of
the advisors, and the host nation government's role in building the
Punjab Irregular Forces and Frontier Corps in North-West Frontier
in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq. Illustrated.
This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population
centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for
the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO).
The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis
represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which
necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme,
whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy
(enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population
from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions
on the ground. "Centric" means to focus efforts only in one
direction or the other. The "centric" banners must be dropped and
the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both
strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource
across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems
appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The US is fighting a
counterinsuregency that necessitates both the destruction of the
enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as
another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national
power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a
comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates
that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced
approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to
achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with
counterinsurgencies now and in the future.
This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in
2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies
Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military
vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study
methodology commonly found in military literature. The final
version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict
case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative
accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders
in Iraq in 2003-2005.
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